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PROPERTY OWNERS' CONSENT PROVISIONS
IN ZONIIG ORDINANCES
HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST*
The courts are concerned with zoning from several angles.
They must construe the language of the ordinances and
determine the remedies that may be invoked in the situa-
tions presented to them. They must decide finally upon
the reasonableness of particular applications of zoning
regulations.' They also have the power to pass upon the
machinery established for dealing with zoning problems.
Obviously the establishment of effective machinery is of
the utmost importance. The Supreme Court cannot pass
upon the merits of every dispute that arises. As far as
possible objections by property owners should be disposed
of before they reach the lower courts.2 A significant part
of the judicial function in connection with the solution of
zoning problems arises from the power to declare invalid
certain administrative devices which seem objectionable.'
Among the devices which legislative bodies have some-
times attempted to establish is that of permitting property
owners to have a part in determining whether particular
-restrictions should be effective. The latest pronouncement
of the Supreme Court is adverse to such a practice. In
State of Washington v. Boberge4 the court had before it an
ordinance providing that a home for the aged might be
erected in a residential district if the written consent of
two-thirds of the property owners within a distance of four-
hundred feet was obtained. The court held that this clause
in the ordinance providing for the consent of property own-
ers made it invalid because in conflict with the due process
clause. The court did not overrule, but expressly dis-
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1iNectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 188 (1928).
2 The most important device for sifting cases is probably the zoning board
of appeals. See BA*En, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZOmNG, 76-112 (1927).
S A court may invoke the due process clause, or in the case of a state
court, the principle of the non-delegability of legislative power, to prevent
the determination of restrictions in a way that does not provide adequate
protection for individual rights.
4 278 U. S. 116 (1928).
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tinguished, the case of Cusack Company v. Chicago5 which
had upheld an ordinance containing a provision as to the
consent of property owners. The reasoning of the court in
the Roberge Case also suggests certain situations where it
would not be unconstitutional to give adjoining property
owners a voice in the determination of what restrictions
should be effective. It may therefore be useful to consider
the extent to which ordinances may incorporate provisions
for property owners' consent.
A number of state courts' have held in accord with the
Roberge Case. None of the opinions spells out the con-
siderations of social policy which must lie in the back of the
minds of the judges. A casual view of such a provision
reveals nothing harmful in the scheme established. There
can be little doubt that the demand for restricting the use
of property through zoning ordinances arose primarily as
a result of the need for the protection of property owners
against the injurious use of individual pieces of property
in the vicinity. The law of nuisance was inadequate to give
such protection. Restrictions in deeds enforceable against
purchasers with notice were uncertain and could not al-
ways be obtained even with the exercise of foresight. The
zoning ordinance has proved far more effective in preserv-
ing property values against the activities of individual
non-conformists. If this is the paramount purpose, the
making of exceptions in restricted districts upon the con-
sent of property owners affected would appear to be an
admirable plan. If a majority or two-thirds of the property
owners, acting on consideration of their own interests, con-
sented, no property would be likely to suffer. The non-
consenting minority would ,rarely be seriously affected.
5242 U. S. 525 (1917).
(,Austin v. Thomas, 96 W. Va. 628, 123 S. E. 590 (1924); Levy v.
Mvralag, 96 N. J. L. 367, 115 Atl. 350 (1921) ; St. Louis v. Russell, 116
Mlo. 248, 22 S. W. 470 (1893); Tilford v. Belknap, 126 Ky. 244, 103 S. W.
289 (1907) ; Wasilewski v. Biedrzycki, 180 Wis. 633, 192 N. W. 989
(1923); Utica v. Hanna, 202 App. Div. 610, 195 N. Y. S. 225 (1922);
Glens Falls v. Standard Oil Co., 127 MIisc. 104, 215 N. Y. S. 354 (1926).
In several cases the particular regulation was held unconstitutional be-
cause not within the police power. The court discussed the question
whether the consent provision had the effect of making valid an otherwise
invalid regulation. It was held that it did not save the ordinance.
Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913) ; State V. Withnell,
78 Neb. 33, 110 N. W. 680 (1907).
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The individual owner desiring to break the restriction
would enjoy greater freedom. Some courts doubtless with
such ideas in mind have upheld ordinances containing the
provisions under discussion.'
But there may be other considerations that will destroy
this picture. It may be suggested that the interests in-
volved in zoning are broader than those outlined. The im-
mediate property owners are not the sole beneficiaries of
such regulations. The community in general is concerned
with orderly urban development. The possibility of plan-
ning for the future in regard to fire protection, sewage dis-
posal and similar matters has frequently been stressed as
an advantage of zoning legislation. A device which places
in the hands of a few property owners the power to regu-
late building in a district would leave such interests unrep-
resented.8 An answer to this question might be that the
legislative body framing the ordinance is the representative
of the community interest. A provision for an exception
if the consent of property owners is obtained, is tantamount
to a declaration that as far as the general interst is con-
cerned, the restriction is a matter of indifference. It is
imposed for the benefit of property owners in a particular
area and may be withdrawn by their action. The property
covered by such consent provision would presumably be
made sufficiently narrow to prevent any possible weakening
of the effectiveness of the general zoning plan. If it should
appear that in a particular instance the legislative body has
placed matters of general public interest in the hands of
property owners, the ordinance might be held invalid.
That is perhaps the explanation of Eubank v. Richmond,
the first Supreme Court case to hold determinations by
property owners invalid. The ordinance there involved pur-
ported to give to the owners of two-thirds of the property
on one side of a square the power to determine that a
7Meyers v. Fortunato, 12 Del. Ch. 374, 110 AtI. 847 (1920); People U.
Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, 105 N. E. 315 (1914); U. S. v. Richards, 35 App.
D. C. 540 (1910); Spokane v. Camp, 50 Wash. 554, 97 Pac. 770 (1908);
State u. Harris, 158 La. 974, 105 So. 33 (1925).
8 This is pointed out in Utica v. Hanna, suPra N. 6.
9 226 U. S. 137 (1912).
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building line for that side of the square should be estab-
lished. The court emphasized the fact that the public
interest would not be served by such a provision.10
The next difficulty that presents itself is the danger of
discriminatory action by property owners. If this power
conferred on property owners is broad enough to enable
them to permit building by some individuals and deny such
permission to others, an undesirable situation results. The
way would be open for a scramble by various interests.
Property owners might, be led for personal or other more
corrupt reasons to show favoritism without regard to the
effect upon interests of the district or the community." It
must be conceded, however, that this can not be a con-
trolling reason in the minds of the justices of the United
States Supreme Court, for in the Roberge Case, 2 the
question presented to the property owners by the ordinance
was confined to whether or not one particular described
building might be erected. That would leave no room for
discrimination.
The most vital objection seems to arise from the pos-
sibility that consents might be purchased." Such action
may be as morally reprehensible as vote-buying. But it
will no doubt be difficult for the property owner to see it
in that light. Criminal statutes do not forbid it. Pur-
chased consents have, however, been held invalid. 4 The
evils of such a practice are apparent. The purpose of
regulations as to the use of property with consent provi-
sions is not to enable adjacent owners to profit financially.
lOEubank v. Richmond, supra n. 9, at 144, "There may be one taste
or judgment of comfort or convenience on one side of a street and a differ-
ent one on the other. There may be diversity in other blocks; and view-
ing them in succession, their building lines may be continuous or stagger-
ing (to adopt a word of the mechanical arts) as the interests of certain
of the propery owners may prompt against the interests of others. * * * *
It is hard to understand how public comfort or convenience, much less
public health, can be promoted by a line which may be so variously dis-
posed."
11This objection was stated in a number of cases including Levy v.
Mivralag, supra n. 6, and St. Louis v. Russell, supra n. 6:
12 Supra n. 4.
'sSee Ernst Freund, "Some Problems in the Law of Zoning," 24 Ill L.
Ruy. 135 at 143 (1929).
14 Greer v. Severson, 119 Iowa 84, 93 N. W. 72 (1903); Doane v. Chicago
City R. R. Co., 160 Ill. 22, 45 N. E. 507 (1895).
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Won-consenting owners would be subjected to the injurious
use without any compensation. 5 Criminal legislation for-
bidding purchased consents might give adequate assurance,
although difficulties of proof are great. To be sure the
possibility of bribery and graft in connection with the
action of administrative boards has not -reduced them to
ineffectiveness. It may be that a clear understanding as
to the impropriety of purchased consents would reduce
this possibility to a point where the resulting evils would
be negligible.
There is little in the opinions to indicate that the courts
have rested their decisions upon the social factors out-
lined above. Occasionally some of them are mentioned. But
the chief ground for declaring ordinances containing con-
sent provisions unconstitutional has been that they leave
the decision to the arbitrary and capricious action of prop-
erty owners. Cases like Yic, Wo v. Hoplins 1 are cited,
in which statutes placing arbitrary power in administra-
tive boards were held invalid. But to compare the action
of property owners to that of administrative boards is to
overlook the whole purpose of such ordinances. The prop-
erty owners are in no sense fulfilling a public duty. The
statutory scheme contemplates that they should give or
withhold their consent in accordance with their view of the
effect of the particular use of property upon their own in-
terests. Collectively they are waiving rights given to them
by the ordinance. Property owners desiring to contest re-
strictions where property owners refuse consent are fully
protected. It must be remembered that the legislative body
in the first instance indicates the particular -restriction
which is to be the subject of the consent. The restriction
must, of course, be reasonable in its particular application
to conform to the due process clause. There would be no
objection to placing the power of making exceptions in a
zoning board of appeals in addition to the consent pro-
vision. Thus there may be adequate sage-guards against
15 This objection would not be present if the ordinance required the con-
sent of all adjoining property owners as did the ordinance involved in
Myers v. Fortunato, supra n. 7.
10 118 U. S. 356 (1886.)
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action that would be unreasonable in the constitutional
sense.
Most of the distinctions that have been pointed out by
the courts in cases involving the constitutionality of con-
sent provisions have no relation to the social policies in-
volved. In the Roberge Case a distinction was made with
respect to the character of the use forbidden. The Cusack
Case 7 involving the regulation of billboards was differenti-
ated on the ground that such a structure was more like a
nuisance than was a home for the aged. None of the
state cases turns upon that point. 8 The Supreme Court
may have sensed an analogy in the cases involving ordi-
nances conferring arbitrary discretion on administrative
boards. These cases have sometimes distinguished between
harmful businesses and those harmless in themselves.'" The
soundness of that distinction is open to question. If it
can be justified, it must be on the ground that the regula-
tion of harmful businesses can never be wholly unreason-
able. Even assuming that the action of property-owners
could be compared to that of a board, that would not serve
to distinguish the Cusack Case. Billboards do not have
an evil character that is independent of the situation and
circumstances. There can be no doubt that an ordinance
prohibiting them might be unreasonable in some of its
applications. The analogy therefore fails. Moreover
the considerations of social policy advanced above apply as
well to slightly tainted structures as to those entirely
harmless. There is equal danger of discrimination. There
is the same opportunity for purchased consents. The only
explanation of the attitude of the Court in the Roberge
Case is that its view as to the desirability of consent pro-
visions had changed since the earlier decision. The fact
that the Cusack Case was not overruled, however, leaves
the way open for extending the classification of harmful
17 Supra n. 5.
is These cases frequently make distinctions based upon whether or not
the structure forbidden is like a nuisance, but it is always mentioned in
connection with the issue of reasonableness, not that of the validity of the
consent provision. See Austin v. Thomas supra n. 6; People v. Village of
Oak Park, 268 Ill. 256, 109 N. E. 11 (1915).
19 See Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, at 94 (1890).
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structures if the Court should again experience a change
of heart.
The distinction advanced in the Cusack Case whereby it
disposed of Eubanlk v. Richmond"0 was tacitly repudiated
in the Roberge Case. This was to the effect that whereas
legislative bodies could not invest property owners with
power to take affirmative action, they might make regula-
tions with power in the property owners to make exceptions
as to their operation. Essentially this would make the
cases turn upon whether the restriction in question would
be effective on the action or on the inaction of property
owners. In both cases they have the same powers. The
method of indicating their position seems immaterial. It
is true, however, that the way of expressing the statutory
provision may throw light on its purpose. And that of
course may enter into the constitutional question. In the
Eubank Case there seems to have been more of an attempt
to invest property owners with powers similar to those of
an administrative board: In the cases where the question
is strictly one of consent of property owners expressed by
action, it is clearer that they are merely permitted to waive
a statutory right passed chiefly for their protection.
The courts have generally given little attention to the
possibility of declaring the consent provisions alone in-
valid, permitting the restrictions to stand whether or not
consents were obtained. The Supreme Court had an op-
portunity to do that in the Roberge Case, for there the
consent provision had been added by a later amendment.
It has been held that the principle that the unconstitution-
ality of a part of a statute invalidates the whole will be
applied with reluctance if the invalid section was added to
an otherwise valid statute by amendment.21 It is difficult
to see why that should not apply to an ordinance. In the
usual case, however, there can be little question that the
consent provision is such an integral part of the scheme
of the ordinance that the whole ordinance must fall with it.
Finally, it may be pointed out that legislative bodies de-
20 upra, n. 9.
21 Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, at 526 (1829), and
cases there cited.
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siring to give property owners a voice may resort to other
devices that differ only slightly. Ordinances making prop-
erty owners' consents merely advisory, leaving final action
to administrative or legislative bodies, are undoubtedly
constitutional. One type of ordinance that has occasionally
been enacted provides that a governmental body may make
an exception provided the consents are first obtained. If
the power is lodged with a legislative body, the action of
property owners is only advisory, since the ordinance might
be changed without the consents. If permission for build-
ing may be granted by an administrative agency conditional
upon first obtaining consents, property owners by withhold-
ing them may prevent withdrawal of the restrictions, al-
though the fact that consents are given is not conclusive.
This accomplishes the same end as ordinances making the
action of property owners final, with a slightly more cum-
bersome procedure. The first objection considered above
would be eliminated since the governmental body may re-
fuse to issue permits if some general community interest
would suffer from the erection of the structure proposed.
Opportunities for discrimination and purchased consents
would still exist, although there may possibly be additional
supervision under such an arrangement. The courts will
no doubt be more inclined to sustain ordinances of this
type.22
There seems to be no insuperable objection to prop-
erty owners' consent provisions with the possible exception
of the evils arising from purchased consents. If some as-
surance can be given that consents will not be purchased
the ordinances should be upheld with certain qualifications.
They should be sufficiently narrow in their application to
prevent the possibility of discrimination. They should not
22 Such ordinances were upheld in Building Inspector V. Stoklosa, 250
Mass. 52, 145 N. E. 262 (1924) and Stockton 'v. Frisbie, 270 Pac. 270 (Cal.
App. 1928). See also Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 10906,
184 N. W. 823 (1921). In Spann v. Dallas, Ill Tex. 250, 235 S. W. 513
(1921), however, one of the reasons given for declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional was that it conferred arbitrary power on a building in-
spector after property owner consents were given.
The writer has been assisted in the collection of cases by Louis D.
MeiseL
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commit matters of general community interest to the de-
cision of property owners within a limited area. Ordinances
providing for final action by a governmental body after
consents are given are more suitable where such broader
interests are involved.
The Supreme Court has left the way open for upholding
ordinances with consent provisions in cases arising in the
future. It is to be hoped that it will abandon some of the
distinctions made in the past. A frank consideration of
the desirability of such legislation will lead it to a sounder
basis for differentiation between the cases.
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